ActiveDisarmament.org serves as an information resource for international relations scholars, journalists, policymakers and members of the global community who have an interest in contributing actively towards minimising the threat of nuclear war.

ActiveDisarmament.org was developed primarily in response to the release of the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, and the elimination of the United States test ban moratorium in May 2003.

The Nuclear Posture Review explicitly names seven nations as contingency targets of nuclear strikes by the United States under conditions that include retaliation against weapons of mass destruction, the realisation of documented trigger scenarios and the alarmingly ambiguous 'catch-all' condition that provides for the possibility of attack in response to "surprising military developments" of an unspecified nature.

As advocates of global security through active disarmament, we are committed to the dissemination of material related to this posture, with the overarching goal of encouraging the United States government to re-implement the Spratt-Furse law banning development of low-yield nuclear weapons, or to develop an international protocol as an ammendment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that serves the same end.

We have found that there is little basis in scientific, political or strategic arguments in support of efforts to develop new nuclear weapons for practical battlefield use. Doing so endangers the nuclear taboo and the principle of deterrence by blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons. It also defies scientific evidence suggesting that conventional weapons are more effective in bunker-busting application than low-yield earth penetrating nuclear weapons.

The pursuit of new nuclear weapons threatens to undermine international arms reduction agreements and, in turn, to increase the probability of WMD proliferation by and to those states named within the NPR document. This is a risk too great for the United States to bear, both in economic and political terms. Allowing for the researching and/or development of new weapons of mass destruction by the very Administration whose foreign policy has depended on arousing international opinion against such weapons is self-defeating.